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**Security Council
Seventy-eighth year**

Letter dated 21 July 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 July 2023 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov, with regard to the order issued by the International Court of Justice on 6 July 2023, on Armenia's request for the modification of the order of 22 February 2023 indicating a provisional measure, in the case concerning *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan)* (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 30, 58, 66, 68, 70, 73, 84 and 132, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar T. Aliyev
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 21 July 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Letter dated 21 July 2023 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General

I write with regard to the recent 6 July 2023 decision of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ” or “Court”), rejecting a request by the Republic of Armenia (“Armenia”).¹ Citing the establishment by the Republic of Azerbaijan (“Azerbaijan”) of a checkpoint on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border (the “Border Checkpoint”), Armenia had requested that the Court modify its 22 February 2023 order to direct Azerbaijan to “withdraw any and all personnel deployed on or along the Lachin Corridor since 23 April 2023 and refrain from deploying any such personnel on or along the Lachin Corridor”. Armenia’s request that the Court take this extraordinary step was premised on the contention that Azerbaijan’s actions could constitute a plausible violation of its non-discrimination obligations under the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).

The Court’s decision to reject Armenia’s request was a unanimous decision by all of the Judges of the Court. While Armenia predictably is touting its loss as the Court just “reaffirming” the Court’s February 2023 order,² the decision actually vindicates Azerbaijan’s sovereign right to secure and protect its borders and stands as a rejection of the arguments made by Armenia in support of its request of a change in circumstance based on the Border Checkpoint.³ Armenia claims in its letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council dated 12 July 2023 (S/2023/533) that “in its latest order of 6 July, the International Court of Justice stated that Azerbaijan’s assertions of its compliance with the Court’s order of 22 February to ensure the unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions along the Lachin corridor, have nothing to do with reality”. This is a blatant misrepresentation of the Court’s 6 July order. Armenia has an international obligation under the Court’s 7 December 2021 order on provisional measures to “refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it

¹ *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan)*, order on Armenia’s request for the modification of the order of 22 February 2023 indicating a provisional measure (6 July 2023).

² See, for example, Twitter post Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Representative of Armenia on International Legal Matters (7 July 2023), <https://twitter.com/YeghisheK/status/1677258693241454592> (“#ICJ reaffirmed the PM indicated in its Order of 22 February 2023, finding that there’s no need for modification of it”); Twitter post, Ani Badalyan, Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia (7 July 2023), <https://twitter.com/ArmSpoxMFA/status/1677424569445957633> (“@CIJ_ICJ unanimously REAFFIRMED its Order of obliging #Azerbaijan to ensure unimpeded access thr[ou]gh #LachineCorridor.”); Twitter post, Embassy of Armenia in Iran (8 July 2023), <https://twitter.com/ArmEmbassyIR/status/1677566161272315906> (“ICJ unanimously REAFFIRMED its Order of obliging Azerbaijan to ensure unimpeded access thr[ou]gh Lachine Corridor”); Twitter post, Embassy of Armenia in Bulgaria (9 July 2023), <https://twitter.com/ArmEmBulg/status/1677962531170660353> (“ICJ unanimously REAFFIRMED its Order of obliging Azerbaijan to ensure unimpeded access thr[ou]gh Lachine Corridor”); Twitter post, Embassy of Armenia in North Macedonia (9 July 2023), <https://twitter.com/ArmNMacedonia/status/1677962802630213635> (“ICJ unanimously REAFFIRMED its Order of obliging Azerbaijan to ensure unimpeded access thr[ou]gh Lachine Corridor”).

³ See *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan)*, order on Armenia’s request for the modification of the order of 22 February 2023 indicating a provisional measure (6 July 2023), para. 32.

more difficult to resolve”.⁴ In its 6 July 2023 order rejecting Armenia’s request for a modification, the Court referred to the “tenuous situation between the Parties” and the “need for effective implementation of the measure indicated in its order of 22 February 2023”, and specifically reaffirmed both the 22 February measure and the obligation of both parties not to aggravate the dispute in its 6 July 2023 order.⁵ The Court went further to state that its order “is without prejudice as to any finding on the merits concerning the parties’ compliance with its order of 22 February 2023”.⁶

In fact, as described below, the remaining impediments to traffic along the Lachin Road are outside of Azerbaijan’s control, but very much within Armenia’s control and disposal.

As set forth in our prior correspondence of 13 June 2023, Azerbaijan established the Border Checkpoint in April 2023 on the Hakari Bridge, which sits at the entrance to the Lachin-Khankandi Road (the “Lachin Road”) on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border. This is the only route into Azerbaijan from Armenia. Azerbaijan took this step to put an end to Armenia’s persistent misuse of the Lachin Road both to import weapons, military equipment and soldiers into Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory,⁷ and to smuggle illegally mined minerals from the Garabagh Economic Region of Azerbaijan (“Garabagh”) to Armenia.⁸ Armenia has been misusing the Lachin Road for more than two years, even after agreeing to peace in the trilateral statement issued by Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Russian Federation on 10 November 2020.⁹

For these two years, Azerbaijan has sought a multilateral solution, calling upon Armenia as well as the Russian Federation peacekeepers (who temporarily control the Lachin Road under the terms of the Trilateral Statement), to halt Armenia’s unlawful

⁴ See *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)*, order on Azerbaijan’s request for the indication of provisional measures (7 December 2021), para. 76.

⁵ 6 July 2023 order, para. 30.

⁶ 6 July 2023 order, para. 32.

⁷ The evidence includes surveillance videos showing Armenian military vehicles using dirt roads north of the Lachin Road to transport weapons and military equipment into Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory. See, for example, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Illegal transportation of military cargo from Armenia to the territory of Azerbaijan continues” (21 March 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/illegal-transportation-of-military-cargo-from-armenia-to-the-territory-of-azerbaijan-continues-video-47105.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Unlawful military transportation for illegal Armenian formations continues” (24 March 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/unlawful-military-transportation-for-illegal-armenian-formations-continues-video-47115.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Information of Azerbaijan Defense Ministry” (21 April 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/information-of-azerbaijan-defense-ministry-video-47397.html>. See also “Armenia military returns from NK after wartime support deployment”, *Armenpress* (19 July 2022), <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1088539.html>.

⁸ Letter dated 19 December 2022 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 19 December 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, (S/2022/979).

⁹ See letter dated 27 February 2023 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 27 February 2023 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, (A/77/774-S/2023/145); letter dated 19 December 2022 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 19 December 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, (S/2022/979); letter dated 28 November 2022 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 28 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations (A/77/611-S/2022/885); letter dated 1 March 2021 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 2 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations (A/75/791-S/2021/212).

activity. However, there was no resolution, and the security situation continued to deteriorate. Earlier this year, for example, Azerbaijan documented numerous incidents where military vehicles belonging to the Armenian Armed Forces were observed delivering military supplies to Garabagh.¹⁰ On 22 April 2023, three Azerbaijani servicemen were seriously injured in a blast caused by a landmine, which was manufactured in Armenia in 2021 after it signed the trilateral statement and was brought into Azerbaijan via the Lachin Road – the only route by which these weapons can be brought into Azerbaijan from Armenia.¹¹

The next day, on 23 April 2023, Azerbaijan established the Border Checkpoint to address the increasingly critical security situation. The Checkpoint operates under Azerbaijan’s Law on the State Border and is used to perform routine checks of identity documents and cargo in a similar manner to other border checkpoints. Since its opening, more than 2,000 Armenian residents have used the Border Checkpoint to travel between Garabagh and Armenia in both directions¹² – a significant increase from the preceding months. However, on 15 June 2023, traffic across the Border Checkpoint came to an abrupt halt when Armenian Armed Forces attacked a group of Azerbaijani border guards and accompanying Russian Federation peacekeeping forces.¹³ One Azerbaijani border guard was seriously injured in the attack.¹⁴ Amid the acute security threat and pending investigation of the attack, traffic across the Border Checkpoint was temporarily suspended. Videos from the aftermath of the attack show a large amount of traffic – which otherwise would have been able to cross the Border Checkpoint that day – backed up along the roads leading to the Checkpoint.¹⁵ Despite

¹⁰ See, for example, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “The Armenian side once again committed a provocation” (5 March 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/the-armenian-side-once-again-committed-a-provocation-46924.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Azerbaijan Army’s servicemen became Shehids as a result of provocation committed by Armenia” (5 March 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/azerbaijan-army-039-s-servicemen-became-shehids-as-a-result-of-provocation-committed-by-armenia-46928.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Illegal transportation of military cargo from Armenia to the territory of Azerbaijan continues” (21 March 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/illegal-transportation-of-military-cargo-from-armenia-to-the-territory-of-azerbaijan-continues-video-47105.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Unlawful military transportation for illegal Armenian formations continues” (24 March 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/unlawful-military-transportation-for-illegal-armenian-formations-continues-video-47115.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Information of Azerbaijan Defense Ministry” (21 April 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/information-of-azerbaijan-defense-ministry-video-47397.html>.

¹¹ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “As a result of Armenian provocation, the Azerbaijan Army’s 3 servicemen were wounded during a mine explosion occurred in the territory of the Shusha region” (22 April 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/as-a-result-of-armenian-provocation-the-azerbaijan-army-s-3-servicemen-were-wounded-during-a-mine-explosion-occurred-in-47406.html>; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Azerbaijan Army’s servicemen blown up on an Armenian-made mine” (22 April 2023), <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/azerbaijan-army-039-s-servicemen-blown-up-on-an-armenian-made-mine-47409.html>.

¹² “Nagorno-Karabakh not under blockade, Azerbaijan insists”, *Politico* (15 June 2023), <https://www.politico.eu/article/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-blockade-checkpoint/>.

¹³ Twitter post, AZTV, @aztvresmi (15 June 2023), <https://twitter.com/aztvresmi/status/1669319334471127042>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No: 328/23, Statement on the military provocation of Armenia against the Lachin state border checkpoint (15 June 2023), <https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no32823>.

¹⁴ “Azerbaijani border guard injured in Armenian firing”, *Caspian News* (16 June 2023), <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijani-border-guard-injured-in-armenian-firing-2023-6-16-23/>.

¹⁵ Twitter post, Nasimi Aghayev, @NasimiAghayev (15 June 2023), <https://twitter.com/NasimiAghayev/status/1669295983157563393?s=20>.

accepting responsibility for the armed attack on the Checkpoint,¹⁶ in the immediate aftermath Armenia resurrected its false rhetoric of Azerbaijan deliberately blocking the Lachin Corridor.¹⁷

Two weeks after the establishment of the Border Checkpoint, instead of working with Azerbaijan to facilitate unimpeded traffic along the Lachin Road, Armenia applied to the Court requesting that it order Azerbaijan effectively to remove the Checkpoint, yet again portraying Azerbaijan's legitimate actions – without any basis – as a threat to the ethnically Armenian residents of Garabagh.

The Court rightly rejected that request. In the course of the parties' correspondence with the Court, Armenia alleged without basis that Azerbaijan purposely and unilaterally was impeding traffic on the Lachin Road in violation of the 22 February 2023 order and its obligations under the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Armenia argued, for example, that Azerbaijan only allows Russian Federation peacekeepers and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to pass through the Border Checkpoint.

Azerbaijan responded by setting out the unequivocal facts, which made clear that while Azerbaijan continues to take all steps at its disposal to restore the full resumption of traffic through the Border Checkpoint as quickly as possible and under safe and secure conditions, its current inability to fully reopen the Border Checkpoint is entirely attributable to Armenia's actions.

First, since December 2022, Armenia has been discouraging local Garabagh residents from using the Lachin Road, but earlier this year it formalized that policy, requiring residents to get prior permission from the unlawful regime Armenia installed in Garabagh in the early 1990s ("Armenia's installed regime") before they travel. On 5 April 2023, the so-called "state minister" of the installed regime, Gurchen Nersisian, issued a public statement that "it will be possible to travel from [Garabagh] to Armenia naturally through Russian peacekeepers, but only with a prior application to and permission from the Centre for Ensuring Cooperation with Russian Peacekeeping Troops".¹⁸ That "Centre" is part of Armenia's installed regime in Garabagh. On 30 April 2023, following the establishment by Azerbaijan of the Border Checkpoint, the installed regime "reaffirm[ed] that the two-way movement between [Garabagh] and Armenia is organized and accompanied exclusively by the Russian peacekeeping troops and the International Committee of the Red Cross" and "[p]eople requiring movement in both directions should apply to the relevant state bodies, in order to solve the issue with the mentioned mechanisms".¹⁹ On 7 June 2023, the so-called "ombudsman" of the installed regime, Gegham Stepanyan, explained in an interview with Armenian media why Armenia continues to require residents in Garabagh to organize their travel in this manner: "Armenians should not be allowed to move ... without a third party, as this will give the Azerbaijani side a reason to

¹⁶ National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia, Message of 15 June 2023, <https://www.sns.am/hy/news/view/859>. See also "Special Report: Tensions Soar as Baku Blocks Humanitarian Aid to Karabakh", *Civilnet* (15 June 2023), <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/742007/special-report-tensions-soar-as-baku-blocks-humanitarian-aid-to-karabakh/>.

¹⁷ Twitter post, Ani Badalyan, Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, @ArmSpoxMFA (15 June 2023), <https://twitter.com/ArmSpoxMFA/status/1669404592440786959?s=20>.

¹⁸ Facebook post, Gurchen Nersisian (5 April 2023), <https://www.facebook.com/Gurchen.Nersisian/posts/pfbid0juGCXSu38DLtUBZi2iLjEkg4N7KT12ccKTHShUNzBQkntaFvsZADkNS9PxW4Egfel> (emphasis added).

¹⁹ Facebook post, NKR Info Center (30 April 2023), <https://www.facebook.com/ArtsakhInformation/posts/pfbid02kXCuMfR3qCqYPCnSaqV158irCnf2AvGLnRpWCFQUdR5T8TADqc5LKZXE5TmLfWcJl>.

claim that free movement along the Lachin corridor has been restored”.²⁰ In other words, Armenia is allowing Garabagh residents to travel only with the Russian Federation peacekeepers or ICRC, because to do otherwise would demonstrate once and for all the safe, proper and effective functioning of the Checkpoint in facilitating movement along the Lachin Road.

Second, even as it continued to publicly condemn Azerbaijan and advocate in political forums resolutions doing the same, Armenia has obstructed finding a solution. For example, since the attack on 15 June 2023, Azerbaijan has been working closely with ICRC and the Russian Federation peacekeeping command so that civilian traffic through the Border Checkpoint could resume as quickly as possible under safe and secure conditions.²¹ Since then, dozens of Armenian patients and their companions have travelled through the Border Checkpoint.²² However, Armenia has refused and continues to refuse to provide a guarantee of non-repetition of the 15 June attack, which meant that only ICRC medical transfers could resume on 25 June 2023.

In the face of Armenia’s intransigence, Azerbaijan has also been attempting to make arrangements with ICRC to use the alternative northern route to Khankandi via Aghdam, to transport humanitarian goods to Garabagh from Azerbaijan and ensure that supplies remain available to Armenian residents.²³ Following the 15 July 2023 meeting between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in Brussels, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, has encouraged the use of the Aghdam-Khankandi route as an important part of ensuring that the needs of the Garabagh residents are met.²⁴ The European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, has also endorsed the proposal.²⁵ Armenia, however, has refused to accept any assistance from Azerbaijan for the residents of Garabagh,

²⁰ “Karabakh ombudsman: Azerbaijan makes special effort not to show Russian peacekeepers in videos”, *News.am* (7 June 2023), <https://news.am/eng/news/764153.html>.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:352/23, Press release on the meeting of Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegation in Azerbaijan Dragana Kojic (24 June 2023), <https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no35223>.

²² See, for example, Twitter post, ICRC (26 June 2023), <https://twitter.com/icrc/status/1673385386532282369?s=24>; “12 medical patients transferred from Karabakh to Armenia”, *News.am* (29 June 2023), <https://news.am/eng/news/768096.html>; “14 medical patients from Artsakh transferred to Armenia with their companions”, *1Lurer.am* (30 June 2023), <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/06/30/14-medical-patients-from-Artsakh-transferred-to-Armenia-with-their-companions/955279>; “15 medical patients transferred from Karabakh to Armenia”, *News.am* (3 July 2023), <https://news.am/eng/news/768571.html>; “17 patients transferred from Nagorno-Karabakh to medical centers in Armenia accompanied by Red Cross”, *1Lurer* (7 July 2023), <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/07/07/17-patients-transferred-from-Nagorno-Karabakh-to-medical-centers-in-Armenia-accompanied-by-Red-Cross/958685>.

²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:352/23, Press release on the meeting of Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegation in Azerbaijan Dragana Kojic (24 June 2023), <https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no35223>.

²⁴ Press remarks by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, following the trilateral meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia (15 July 2023), <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/15/press-remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-trilateral-meeting-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/>.

²⁵ “EU Backs Azeri Supply Line for Karabakh”, *Azatutyun.am* (19 July 2023), <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32510512.html>.

and it appears that concrete barriers have been set up on the Aghdam-Khankandi road to prevent its use for this purpose.²⁶

Azerbaijan has also repeatedly called for cooperation between Armenia's and Azerbaijan's border agencies to ensure smooth operation of the Border Checkpoint,²⁷ including raising, in early 2023, the possibility of a coordinated border control. Armenia continues to ignore such calls for cooperative action.

As Azerbaijan advised the Court, it has been taking every step available to it to reopen the Border Checkpoint and restore in full the traffic on the Lachin Road, while at every turn Armenia has resisted finding a solution. Garabagh residents thus remain tragically caught in the middle, as Armenia apparently seeks to score political points in its public relations campaign against Azerbaijan. The situation requires Armenia's constructive engagement, not more political games or unfounded requests to the Court.

On 11 July 2023, following the Court's decision, Azerbaijan was again forced to temporarily suspend traffic through the Border Checkpoint when its State Border Service intercepted four drivers hired by ICRC attempting to transport unauthorized goods in vehicles displaying the ICRC emblem.²⁸ ICRC confirmed that it has taken immediate action to terminate its service contracts with the drivers, who were not ICRC staff members and acted without the knowledge of ICRC.²⁹ Azerbaijan worked closely with ICRC to restore access for medical transfers and humanitarian supplies as quickly as possible, and ICRC travel through the Border Checkpoint resumed on 14 July 2023.³⁰

Azerbaijan remains firmly committed to normalizing its bilateral relations with Armenia, with the aim of building a peaceful, secure, stable and prosperous Caucasus.³¹ In recent months, Azerbaijan and Armenia held a number of high-level

²⁶ "Our link should be with Armenia only: Karabakh residents comment on their blocking of Askeran-Aghdam road", *News.am* (19 July 2023), <https://news.am/eng/news/771284.html>; "Karabakh residents block Askeran-Aghdam motorway, with concrete barriers" (photos), *News.am* (18 July 2023), <https://news.am/eng/news/771125.html>.

²⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No: 362/23, Press Release on the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia held in Arlington, Virginia (30 June 2023), <https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no36223>.

²⁸ "Azerbaijan's SBS detected various types of smuggling attempts in ICRC vehicles-VIDEO", *APA* (11 July 2023), <https://apa.az/en/military/azerbaijans-sbs-detected-various-types-of-smuggling-attempts-in-icrc-vehicles-video-407397>.

²⁹ ICRC statement on transport of unauthorized goods across the Lachin corridor (11 July 2023), <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-statement-transport-unauthorised-goods-across-lachin-corridor>.

³⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:392/23, Press release on the meeting of Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, with Dragana Kojic, Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Delegation in Azerbaijan (14 July 2023), <https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no39223>.

³¹ Statement by Yashar Aliyev, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly under agenda item 14, "Culture of peace" (14 June 2023), <https://un.mfa.gov.az/files/shares/Statements/2023/Statement%20by%20Azerbaijan%20on%20Culture%20of%20Peace.pdf>, p. 3 ("Despite the devastating consequences of the aggression unleashed against my country and unspeakable atrocities and sufferings that our people have endured, it was Azerbaijan that, following the end of the war, genuinely proposed to Armenia normalizing inter-State relations. This initiative has been widely supported by the international community. Azerbaijan remains fully committed to the objectives of a peaceful, secure, stable and prosperous region and will continue its efforts towards advancing post-conflict peacebuilding, reintegration and development in the region.").

meetings to progress negotiations of a peace treaty,³² including talks in Washington, D.C., and Brussels in the past two weeks. Issues related to border security, safety and transparency are part of the ongoing peace negotiations.

In conclusion, please be advised that Azerbaijan has called upon Armenia to cease opposing or impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the Aghdam-Khankandi route in the humanitarian interest of the ethnic Armenian residents of Garabagh, and to immediately provide a guarantee of non-repetition of its unprovoked 15 June 2023 attack on the Border Checkpoint.

Azerbaijan welcomes the Court's decision to reject Armenia's request for modification and calls upon the international community to urge Armenia to engage constructively with Azerbaijan to achieve a lasting peace.

(Signed) Jeyhun **Bayramov**

³² See letter dated 13 June 2023 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 14 June 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations (A/77/915-S/2023/435), p. 7; United States Department of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Closing Plenary Session with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov: remarks" (29 June 2023), <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-closing-plenary-session-with-armenian-foreign-minister-ararat-mirzoyan-and-azerbaijani-foreign-minister-jeyhun-bayramov/>. Representatives from Azerbaijan and Armenia met on 1–4 May, 13 and 14 May, 19 May, 25 May and 27–29 June.